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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a destitute, lower-class laborer in Brazil.1  As you are hard 
at work one day, a foreign man whom you have never seen before asks if you will 
sell one of your kidneys for an American woman dying of kidney failure.  He offers 
you a sum of $25,000, and he assures you that all your travel and medical expenses 
will be covered.2  Moved by the chance to help save a stranger’s life and by the good 
fortune to make some quick (and much-needed) money, you excitedly agree to be 
flown to a hospital in South Africa to undergo the transplant procedure.  But matters 
quickly sour.  You receive only $6,000 of the promised sum, and when you return 
home, you find criminal charges filed against you for participation in an illegal organ 
trade.  To make matters worse, you have begun developing health complications 
from the hurried procedure.3 
Now picture yourself as a female college student at an Ivy League institution in 
the United States.4  One day as you are leafing through the school newspaper, an 
                                                                
1Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a Kidney 
on a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at 1.  The following relates the 
true story of Alberty Jose da Silva, a 38-year old Brazilian who has been implicated in a 
worldwide black market organ trade.   
2Id. 
3Id. 
4This story derives from a particularly attractive advertisement in a 1999 college 
newspaper.  The ad reads as follows: “Help our dream come true…couple seeking egg donor.  
Candidates should be intelligent, athletic, blonde, at least 5’10”, have a 1400+ SAT score, and 
possess no major family medical issues.  $50,000.”  SoYouWanna.com, So You Wanna 
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advertisement catches your eye: “$50,000 guaranteed for eggs.  Must have blonde 
hair and blue eyes, have minimum SAT score of 1450, be no shorter than 5’6”, be of 
attractive physique, and be in overall good health.”  Judging yourself compatible 
with these requirements, you follow up on the ad and begin the procedure to donate 
your eggs.  However, the experience does not quite live up to the advertisement.  Not 
only do you endure an extremely invasive procedure, including having to take 
hormone-stimulating drugs that possibly present unknown risks to your health, but 
you also receive much less than the promised $50,000.5 
Although these two situations at first glance appear worlds apart, the dilemmas 
suffered by their protagonists derive from a common source: federal, state and 
international statutory prohibitions on organ sales.  In the United States and many 
countries throughout the world, selling non-regenerative organs for monetary gain 
constitutes a serious criminal offense.6  Notwithstanding this strong ban on the sale 
of organs, United States citizens are permitted to sell other “parts” of their bodies, 
including blood, sperm, and eggs (“ova”), for market value because current statutes 
do not consider reproductive cells and other regenerative tissue “organs” or even 
within the ambit of “parts.”7  Rather, in most contexts, regenerative cells and tissue 
are thought of as “products” of the human body.  In fact, the United States remains 
one of only a few industrialized nations that allow the sale of human reproductive 
cells (“gametes”).8 
Given the similarities between the unfortunate stories above, however, such a 
“Products vs. Organs” distinction is no longer tenable in this age of rapidly-
developing medical research.  The incongruous management of alienation of human 
body parts needs to be reconciled with traditional principles of property law.  This 
note seeks to bring the legal status of gametes into line with that of organs using the 
framework of property rights.  This note will argue that, since the law justifiably 
prohibits people from selling organs, it should likewise bar them from selling any 
                                                          
Donate an Egg?, http://www.soyouwanna.com/site/syws/donateegg/donateeggFULL.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2004). 
I challenge readers of this note to consult their local city or college newspaper, as they will 
find advertisements quite similar to this one. 
5NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, THINKING OF BECOMING AN EGG 
DONOR? GET THE FACTS BEFORE YOU DECIDE! 7 [hereinafter “GET THE FACTS”] (Oct. 2002), at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nyudoh/infertility/pdf/1127.pdf. 
6National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2004). 
7
“Human organ[s]” include the following under § 274e: human (including fetal) kidneys, 
liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin “or any subpart thereof.”  
42 U.S.C. § 274e.   
8The United Kingdom and France make illegal the outright sale of reproductive cells.  
David B. Resnik, Eggs for Sale, 3 J. MED. ETHICS 1 (2000), 
http://www.ecu.edu/medhum/newsletter/ spring2000_p1.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).  
Also, Canada has banned sales of human eggs and sperm.  Michelle Blackley, Eggs For 
Sale: The Latest Controversy in Reproductive Technology: Couples Are Paying Lofty Fees to 
Egg Donors With the Perfect Combination of Brains and Beauty, USA TODAY MAGAZINE 
(July 2003), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2698_132/ai_ 
104971305 (last visited Oct. 27, 2004). 
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parts of their bodies - even the products thereof (specifically sperm and ova) - as 
disposable personal property.  This note will conclude with the proposition that a 
system of total market-inalienability and uncompensated donation of human body 
parts will best fulfill the economic goal of supplying organs and gametes to those in 
need of them while simultaneously protecting donors from any coercion of sale. 
Part II of this note will begin by surveying the philosophical and doctrinal 
underpinnings of property law as they relate to human beings and their bodies and 
will continue with an exploration of the impact, both theoretical and actual, of 
commodification on market behavior.  Then, through case study at both the federal 
and state levels, Part II will assess the historical judicial hesitance against 
recognizing any outright property interests in the human body or its components.  
Part III will describe the current state of the law prohibiting market sales of human 
organs and factual data regarding organ donations.  It will then move to a discussion 
of contemporary policies for and against the sale of “non-regenerative” organs.   
Part IV will explain why sales of gametes are contrastingly permitted in the 
United States and will position arguments supporting the sale and purchase of sperm 
and ova as distinguishable from organs.  Finally, Part V will compare and analyze 
the preceding arguments and will argue that the statutory prohibition on monetary 
compensation for organs should extend uniformly to gametes.  This paper will 
conclude with the proposition that the law should authorize only profit-less donations 
of either organs or gametes and only allow reimbursement costs to donors for 
expenses incident to the donation procedures. 
II. HISTORICO-LEGAL TREATMENT OF THE HUMAN BODY 
A. Doctrinal and Philosophical Theories  
on “Propertization” of the  Human Body 
In order to determine whether any property right in the human body exists, 
property itself should first attain a satisfactory definition.  However, this task proves 
to be quite difficult, if not practically impossible, since property has always been an 
abstract concept at best.9  Contrary to the common tendency to define property with 
respect to physical objects, property actually refers to “rights or relationships among 
people with respect to [those objects].”10  And so, most property theorists envision 
property as a “bundle of rights” – a commingled group of separate rights gained 
when one acquires property.11  Classically, these include the right to use property, the 
right to exclude others from using one’s property, and the right to transfer or 
“alienate” property.12  Regardless of whatever definition of property one uses 
however, property, as a societal vehicle in attributing wealth, must have its basis in 
some broader justifying theory.13 
                                                                
9JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY, 93 (4th ed. 2002). 
10Id.  
11Id. 
12Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra 
note 9, at 93. 
13Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Property: Toward a Property Right in Human 
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990). 
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Indeed, several theories were advanced to justify property rights.  To begin with, 
John Locke espoused a theory of property grounded in principles of natural law.14  In 
regard to human beings and property, Locke stated that all people by nature have a 
property interest in their own “person.”15  This right derived from one of Locke’s 
central theses: people could own things external to themselves only because they 
first have ownership in their own bodies.16   
Similarly, Georg Frederic Hegel postulated that ownership of one’s body 
necessarily precedes ownership of any external things.17  However, Hegel diverged 
from Locke when maintaining that no absolute property rights in one’s body could 
exist;18 rather, human beings decide when and how they wish to relinquish their 
rights to “the members of [their] bod[ies].”19  Thus, Hegel took Locke’s natural 
rights theory and added the element of human choice into the calculus of defining 
property rights. 
However, a second property theory stands diametrically opposed to natural rights 
theory: utilitarianism.  With Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as its primary 
advocates, utilitarianism generally holds that property rights exist only because 
human behavior and laws create and grant them.20  For Mill, the ideal notion of 
property contained the rights to things that human beings produce by their own 
labor.21  Accordingly, Mill reasoned that no property right in the human body could 
exist, since the body is not a product of human labor.22  Furthermore, Mill lamented 
that the law “ha[s] made property of things which never ought to be property, and 
absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist.”23  Thus, while 
early natural rights theorists assumed and almost took for granted that property right 
exists in the human body, utilitarians contrarily denied that people have this right.   
With this divergent quandary in mind and in order to strike a balance between 
these two competing theories, in 1987 law professor Margaret Jane Radin, proposed 
her “personhood model” for property rights in a highly influential law review 
article.24  Developing her model under the auspices of Kant and Hegel, Professor 
Radin promoted that the closer something is to the human identity and self, the less 
accurately it can be considered property.25  In other words, those aspects, attributes, 
and qualities of the human person – those that are so qualitatively vital to the concept 
                                                                
14See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (3d ed. 1968). 
15Id. 
16Bray, supra note 13, at 212. 
17Id. at 213.  GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44 (T. Knox trans. 1967). 
18Bray, supra note 13, at 213. 
19HEGEL, supra note 17, at § 47. 
20JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. I, 123-25 (1904). 
21Id. at 133. 
22Bray, supra note 13, at 213. 
23MILL, supra note 20, bk. III, at 208. 
24Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
25Id. at 1907. 
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of human identity, those that are quintessentially “human” – should never receive 
property status.  Although Radin did not directly address the issue of whether the 
human body is property under this “personhood” paradigm, she appreciated that all 
body parts could be esteemed as so “integral to the [human] self” that they are 
essentially distinct from vulgar, fungible market commodities.26 
Crucial to Radin’s thesis is the notion of separability: “[t]o conceive of 
something personal as fungible assumes that the person and the attribute, right, or 
thing, are separate.”27  In regard to human bodies and parts, separability translates 
like this: conceiving of a human organ, which likely would be deemed as truly 
personal to human self and identity, as “monetizable or completely detachable from 
the person . . . is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be 
human.”28  For Radin, not unlike Mill in this respect, separability of the human 
person from the body portends the very real danger of viewing all other people as 
objects, attainable and ownable as personal property.  
Radin’s personhood analysis further developed the concept of separability within 
the context of a fundamental right in the “bundle” of property rights: alienability.  
Following Hegel, she defined alienation plainly as “the separation of something . . . 
from its holder.”29  Applying that model to the human person, she argued that only 
those things inherently separate from the human self can be alienated from it.30 
Just as the Declaration of Independence professes its list of “inalienable rights,”31 
certain rights are indeed inherently inalienable.32  While American property rights 
generally enjoy a presumption of full alienability, certain “exceptional” property 
rights are denied this status completely.33  As Radin suggests, total inalienability 
yields many nuances in meaning, in some instances denoting not subject to transfer 
or not subject to commercial sale, while in others carrying the connotation of rights 
not relinquishable, waivable or perishable at the hand of their holders.34  For the 
purposes of this note, “inalienability” refers to that category of property not subject 
to commercial sale - that certain things are of such nature that they can never be 
transferred by contract for sale in exchange for valuable consideration.35  Radin 
terms this species of non-salability “market-inalienability.”36 
                                                                
26Id. at 1906.  Examples of “everyday” fungible commodities may include automobiles, 
baseball cards, steak dinners, currency, and deeds to parcels of land. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Id. at 1852. 
30Id. 
31THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
32Radin, supra note 24, at 1849. 
33Id. at 1850. 
34Id. at 1849-50. 
35See id. at 1850; Radin’s extreme example for a “non-salable” is that of a “market in 
infants”; see also Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 23 
(1978). 
36Radin, supra note 24, at 1850. 
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Nevertheless, Professor Radin was careful to assure that non-salability does not 
mandate per se prohibitions on donative transfers as well.37  Gifts of market-
inalienable objects are always permissible in such a regime, according to Radin, 
because “[n]on-giveability” (the prohibition against donative transfers) occupies a 
separate sphere of inalienability from non-salability;38 that is, they are, visually 
speaking, two circles that overlap in certain situations but do not overlap in others.  
And so, Radin explicated an essential aspect of market-inalienability when stating 
that, while property classified as market-inalienable cannot be transferred by contract 
for sale, it may be transferred by gift.39   
Still, the genius of Radin’s market-inalienability model did not fully shine 
through until she further applied it to the concept of commodification.40  Generally, a 
“commodity” is any article of trade or commerce for sale in a particular market.41  In 
the simplest sense, commodification describes legally permitting the buying and 
selling of some thing.42  For Radin, however, commodification of the human body 
poses an even greater danger than simply buying and selling on the market.  For in 
another, broader sense, commodification not only means actual salability on the 
market but also includes general “market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about 
interactions as if they were sale transactions.”43  In other words, commodification 
represents the subconscious categorizing of something as a market good.  Radin 
argues that, once this first step of commodification occurs, that is, “once market 
value enters our discourse” in regards to a certain object in the primary instance of 
sale, a slippery slope will result, and “market rhetoric will take over and characterize 
every [future] interaction in terms of market value.”44   
When the concept of commodification is applied to the human body, treating it as 
an article of commerce in a few preliminary transactions (sales of organs, for 
example) would eventually lead to the human body itself being thought of as a 
fungible commodity.45  More specifically, once the first legally-sanctioned barter of 
a human kidney commences, it will be only a matter of time before all kidneys will 
be considered and sought after as market commodities. 
And so, applying market-inalienability to the concept of commodification, Radin 
argued that “[b]y making something nonsalable we proclaim that it should not be 
conceived of or treated as a commodity.”46  As a result, Radin advocated a 
prophylactic rule against outright sale of children, sexual services, physical 
                                                                
37Id. at 1854-55. 
38Id. at 1853. 
39Id. at 1854-55. 
40Id. at 1855.   
41
“The term embraces only tangible goods, such as products or merchandise . . . .”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
42Radin, supra note 24, at 1859. 
43Id. 
44Id. at 1914. 
45Id. at 1907. 
46Id. at 1855. 
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characteristics, and body parts because “such commodification [would be] 
destructive of personhood . . . .”47  Thus, Radin completed her model of personhood 
theory of property by declaring that all rights, attributes, and things intrinsically 
unique to the human person must not be commodified.48  The appropriate means to 
accomplish this goal of non-commodification of the human body lies in deeming it 
and its composite parts market-inalienable.   
Although philosophers and theorists have disagreed on whether or not the body is 
property, Professor Radin’s personhood model of property rights strikes a delicate 
and appropriate balance.  Even if it could be said that people have property rights in 
their own bodies, those rights still must be carefully limited.  One necessary and 
proper limit, as Radin suggests, is to deem the human body and its parts market-
inalienable.49  This vision of non-salability best preserves the utmost dignity and 
respect for the human vessel by not allowing a price tag to be affixed to it while at 
the same time permitting free donation for much-needed human organs, tissue, and 
cells. 
B.  Case History of the Human Body and its Parts as “Quasi” Property 
Historically, American law has been consistently averse to allowing people to 
treat their body parts like normal parcels of personal property.50  This fact may 
arouse curiosity and concern, since the Declaration of Independence affirms the right 
to the pursuit of happiness and the concomitant right to own property to be 
“inalienable.”51  However, the Framers’ intent was likely not to include a property 
right in one’s body as one of those constitutionally protected rights.52 
Following English common law, courts in the United States initially refused to 
recognize any property interest in a human corpse, particularly for purposes of 
burial.53  Despite this early reluctance, several 19th century state courts labored to 
grant plaintiffs recovery for the right to bury their next of kin.54  For instance, in 
1890, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed a father and mother to recover in tort for 
the negligent disposal of their deceased daughter’s body.55  Although positioning its 
                                                                
47Id. at 1910. 
48Id. at 1907. 
49Id. at 1903. 
50Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 29 (Oct. 1986). 
51THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
52Bray, supra note 13, at 218. 
53ALEXANDER M. CAPRON & IRWIN M. BIRNBAUM, 5-23 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 
21.02, at 2 (24th ed. 2004); see also Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 824 (Ind. 1890) 
(surveying the refusal of English common law courts to hear actions for the “disturbance of 
the remains of . . . buried ancestors”). 
54O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal. 1899); Renihan, 25 N.E. at 824. 
55Renihan, 25 N.E. at 823 (stating in the facts that undertakers refused to provide the 
location of the daughter’s body except with the trite explanation “[y]our child is in Ohio”). 
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holding on evanescent “burial rights,” the Indiana court reasoned that a dead body 
belongs to the surviving relatives as “other property.”56   
This nebulous notion of “other” property received a more perfect definition as 
“quasi-property” in a California case several years later.57  In O’Donnell v. Slack,58 
the California Supreme Court held that a quasi-property right to a decedent’s body 
vests in the next of kin.59  Specifically, the decedent O’Donnell had expressed his 
last wish to his widow that he be buried beside his parents’ remains in Ireland, which 
wish the widow did not follow.60  While the California court expressly held that the 
human body itself is not personal property disposable by probate, it recognized some 
species of legal ownership by the next of kin in a deceased relative’s body.61 
More recently, courts have acknowledged the rights of next of kin to recover for 
civil deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62  This federal statute allows 
recovery for deprivation of property under color of state statute without due process 
of law.63  Several cases implicated coroners who had removed the decedents’ corneas 
without obtaining consent from the next of kin.64  The coroners in each situation 
claimed to have acted pursuant to state statutes that purported to allow the removal 
of corneas “provided that the coroner has no knowledge of an objection by the 
decedent, the decedent’s spouse, or . . . the next of kin . . . .”65  The relatives of the 
deceased subsequently brought suit, alleging that their legal rights in the decedents’ 
bodies had been violated by the coroners’ actions.  Recall, however, that in the 
United States, a human corpse is not the personal property either of the next of kin or 
                                                                
56Id. at 825. 
57O’Donnell, 55 P. at 907. 
58Id.  
59Id.  
60Id. at 906. 
61Id. at 907. 
6242 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).  “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 
63Id. 
64Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1029 
(2002); Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir. 1995); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 
F.2d 477, 478 (6th Cir. 1991). 
65Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478 (paraphrasing OHIO REV. CODE § 2108.60); see also Whaley, 
58 F.3d at 1116 (equating Michigan’s Anatomical Gift law with Ohio’s); Newman, 287 F.3d 
788 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 27491.47(a): “the coroner may, in the course of the autopsy, 
remove . . . corneal eye tissue . . . if . . . the coroner has no knowledge of objection to the 
removal . . .).  Note that the Ohio and California statutes involved are codifications of the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 
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of the state.66  With each plaintiff having successfully recovered damages, the federal 
circuit courts remarkably surmounted the legal obstacle of the “deprivation of 
property” element necessary in a § 1983 action.67 
In Brotherton v. Cleveland,68 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the concept of 
property escapes exact legal definition because it is often conceptualized as a 
“bundle of rights.”69  And so, that court held that the aggregate of these rights 
combine to form a “substantial interest” in the dead body, regardless of whatever 
title this combination of rights may be given.70  In dissent, Justice Joiner reminded 
the court of the steadfast refusal under Ohio law to recognize any property right in a 
deceased human body.71  Justice Joiner was troubled at the court’s virtual “creat[ion 
of] a property right” in a dead body by allowing a plaintiff to recover for deprivation 
of property under § 1983.72  
Even before Justice Joiner voiced his dissent in Brotherton, the Florida Supreme 
Court had upheld as constitutional a statute allowing medical examiners to remove 
corneal tissue from decedents for necessary transplantations.73  In an opinion 
predicting Joiner’s concerns about granting property status to human bodies, the 
court in Florida v. Powell held that no full property right to a deceased relative’s 
body vests in the next of kin, but rather a right strictly “limited to ‘possession of the 
body . . . for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful disposition.’”74  
Cautioning that any cognizable right to a human body must be limited to that sole 
purpose of proper burial, the court proclaimed the inherent difficulty in 
distinguishing the human body from the traditional legal framework of property 
law75 and fashioned its decision on the strictly delimited right to bury the decedent.76 
Four years after Brotherton, in Whaley v. Tuscola,77 the Sixth Circuit again 
declared that the aggregation of the rights to a decedent’s body should allow the next 
                                                                
66POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW, 158 (ABC-
CLIO 2003). 
67Three elements are necessary to establish a violation of due process under § 1983: (1) 
deprivation, (2) of property, (3) under color of state law.  Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 479 
(emphasis added). 
68Id. 
69Id. at 481. 
70Id. at 482. 
71Id. at 483. 
72Id. 
73Florida v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1986). 
74Id. at 1191 (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)). 
75
“It seems reasonably obvious that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to 
meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are 
being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.”  Id. at 1192 (citing W. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 43-4 (2d ed. 1955)). 
76Powell, 497 So.2d at 1192.  
77Whaley, 58 F.3d 1111, 1115. 
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of kin to recover for any violation of those rights.78  The Sixth Circuit found that the 
distinctive rights to dispose of a human body, to make a gift of its parts, to prevent its 
expropriation by others, and to possess it for burial quantitatively add up to “the 
heart and soul of the common law understanding of ‘property.’”79  In an even 
stronger opinion than what it had issued in Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit “look[ed] 
beyond the law’s nomenclature and to its substance” and used a generously 
malleable definition of property to allow the plaintiff to recover.80  Thus, although 
still hesitant to state explicitly the existence of an outright property right to a human 
body, federal courts began to allow recovery on the basis of a combination of “other” 
rights.81 
Following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in Newman v. 
Sathyavaglswaran82 held that the identification of constitutional property interests 
“turns on the substance of the interest recognized, not the name given that interest.”83  
Following the quasi-property rationale of earlier decisions, the Newman court held 
that the coroners had “chopped through the bundle [of property rights of the 
decedents’ next of kin], taking a slice of every strand” by removing the decedents’ 
corneas without prior consent.84  Newman instructs that, since the human body and 
its parts enjoy at best only a “quasi-property” status, state actions grounded in 
common law torts such as conversion or replevin will likely be untenable.85  Thus, 
ostensibly due to the flexible nature of the rights upon which plaintiffs sue under § 
1983, federal actions have been contrastingly more successful than actions based on 
state common law.  
Nevertheless, it would be unfounded to maintain that questions have not arisen 
on the state level regarding the property status of human body parts.  Perhaps the 
most intriguing case is Venner v. Maryland,86 addressing whether human excrement 
could be the property of its owner.  Venner involved the determination that an 
unreasonable search and seizure of criminal defendant Charles Venner’s feces did 
not occur during a narcotics investigation.87  The defendant had ingested twenty-one 




“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law – rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and 
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. at 1114 (citing Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). 
81
“Just because the woman cannot technically ‘replevin’ her husband’s body does not 
mean she has no legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”  Whaley, 58 F.3d at 1116. 
82Newman, 287 F.3d 786, 797. 
83Id. 
84Id. at 798. 
85
“All authorities generally agree that the next of kin have no property right in the remains 
of a decedent.”  Powell, 497 So.2d at 1191.   
86Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976). 
87Id. 
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balloons filled with hashish oil in a daring attempt to smuggle the illegal substance 
across state lines.88  With Venner suddenly hospitalized due to a resultant drug 
overdose after one balloon “fortuitous[ly]” exploded in his stomach, police seized his 
leavings to obtain the balloons as evidence.89  Before his trial, Venner motioned to 
suppress the balloons from evidence, claiming that they had been obtained in a 
warrantless search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.90 
Most intriguing is the general holding of Venner that human waste could possibly 
be considered property; the Venner court held that human waste “or other materials 
which were once a part of or contained within [the] body” are subject to property 
rights and that any person may assert rights over excrement.91  Thus, since Venner 
did not assert such dominion and control over his feces or the balloons 
accompanying, he had legally abandoned his property, or more specifically 
“whatever legal right he theretofore had” in it.92  The Venner court was certainly not 
as wary as the federal Circuit Courts about referring to the body as property, but it 
still vacillated concerning the nature of the legal rights Venner had in his waste. 
Furthermore, using the doctrinal basis from cases involving the disposition of 
dead bodies, another state court, speaking explicitly of gametes as the personal 
property of their owners, extended the quasi-property analysis to the bequest of 
human sperm.93  In Hecht v. Superior Court,94 the decedent William H. Kane had 
attempted to bequeath by his last will and testament his sperm that he had deposited 
at a Los Angeles sperm bank.95  Kane’s will read, in pertinent part: “I bequeath all 
right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my sperm stored with 
any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht.”96  In a 
tremendous leap, the Hecht court, expressly stating that the decedent had a property 
interest in accordance with the California Probate Code’s definition of property,97 
held that the decedent could probate his sperm cells.  Stating that Kane had an 
undeniable interest in the disposition of his frozen sperm cells, the court explained 
that “even if not governed by the general law of personal property, [they would still] 
occup[y] ‘an interim category’” of ownership and legal protection.98  Thus, although 
                                                                
88Id. at 486. 
89Id. at 489-90. 
90Id. at 486. 
91Id. at 498. 
92Id. at 499. 
93Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). 
94Id. 
95Id. at 276.   
96Id.  Kane also had a contract with the sperm bank which provided for similar disposition 
to Deborah. 
97Defined as “anything that may be the subject of ownership and includes both real and 
personal property and any interest therein.”  CAL. PROBATE CODE § 62 (West 2002). 
98Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 
1992)). 
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state courts have remained consistently hostile to recognizing any traditional 
property interest in a human body or a part thereof, Hecht teased out of the prior law 
a narrow comprehension of property rights in human cells.99 
Despite this longstanding debate regarding legal rights over one’s body parts, no 
case, state or federal, has had more of an impact on the issue of property rights in the 
human body than the California Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Regents of 
University of California.100  Moore’s legal vigor and import stems not as much from 
what the Supreme Court of California said in its landmark decision, but rather in 
what it failed to say. 
In Moore, the plaintiff had undergone several treatments for hairy-cell leukemia 
at UCLA Medical Center as well as numerous and extensive extractions of “blood, 
bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances.”101  Unbeknownst to Moore, his 
physician, Dr. Golde, was conducting extensive research on Moore’s very rare cells 
with the motive of developing and patenting a new commercial cell line derived from 
them.102  Moore subsequently sued the medical center and Dr. Golde for breach of 
fiduciary duty, lack of informed consent, and, most importantly, conversion.103   
The California Court of Appeals in Moore, by allowing Moore to recover on his 
conversion theory, recognized a complete property right in the human body.104  
However, in reversing that decision, the California Supreme Court avoided the issue 
of whether Moore’s cells were his property, holding only that Moore’s conversion 
theory must fail because he neither had title to nor possession of his cells after they 
had been removed from his body and altered by Dr. Golde to the new cell line.105  
The Moore court found no judicial precedent supporting Moore’s claim of 
conversion and also declared that the subject of the Regents’ patent – the invention 
of a qualitatively different and novel cell line – could no longer be viewed as 
Moore’s property.106  As the California Supreme Court did not address the appellate 
court’s competence of a full property right, the only guidance given by Moore on 
whether the human body is property lies in its statement that the law treats human 
tissues, organs, blood, and dead bodies as objects sui generis – physical objects not 
within the parameters of traditional personal property.107 
                                                                
99Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849. 
100Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990). 
101Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 125. 
102Id. at 126. 
103Id. at 124. 
104Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 215 Cal. App. 3d 709, 728-29 (1988), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479 (1990).  Conversion is “a tort that protects against 
interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.”  Moore, 51 Cal. 3d 
at 134. 
105
“Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to have been converted, nor 
possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion.” Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136 
(citing Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 610-11 (1981)). 
106Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 137. 
107Id. 
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In a concurring opinion in Moore, Justice Arabian voiced the moral rationale for 
rejecting Moore’s claim for conversion of his cells.108  Arabian articulated the 
problem of commodification of human body parts – “the selling of one’s own body 
tissue for profit” – as an inclement degradation of “the human vessel – the single 
most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society.”109  Focusing on the 
possible adverse effects on human dignity of any resultant “marketplace in human 
body parts,” Arabian warned that courts should forbear from any pronouncement that 
the human body or any part thereof is property.110  “Clearly the Legislature, as the 
majority opinion suggests, is the proper deliberative forum” for any such 
pronouncement.111   
At this juncture, there may appear an irreconcilable legal disparity.  While on the 
one hand some courts have held that the human body and its parts are not property, 
several courts, on the other hand, have openly declared human waste and cells to be 
some kind of personal property of their “owner.”  However, this disparity is likely 
illusory and merely the result of confusing misuse of terminology throughout these 
cases.  As a Comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868112 illustrates, the 
incongruity in judicial language regarding human bodies is simply a by-product of 
the legal difficulty of pigeonholing the unique nature of the human body into 
traditional property concepts.113  The Restatement authors recognized that courts, 
whether interchangeably or by inconsistency, use the terms “property” and “quasi-
property” in reference to the rights that people or next of kin, respectively, have in 
human bodies.114  The Comment argues that this mere technicality should be 
disregarded, because the tort of interference with dead bodies is an action seeking 
damages, not for violation of any property right, but rather for mental distress 
suffered as a result of the tort.115 
Consider also the following excerpt from Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit 
& Trust Co.,116 a case which “summarized” Maryland’s law on this issue117: 
                                                                
108Id. at 148. 
109Id. 
110Id. at 149-50. 
111Id. 
112RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979).  “One who intentionally, recklessly or 
negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or 
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of 
the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.” 
113RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 Cmt. a.  “This does not, however, fit very well 
into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no 
utility, and can be used only for the one purpose of interment and cremation.” 
114Id.  
115Id. 
116Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 387 A.2d 244, 246 (Md. Ct. App. 
1978). 
117Powell, 497 So.2d at 1192. 
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[i]t is universally recognized that there is no property in a dead body in a 
commercial or material sense.  It is not a part of the assets of the estate . . . 
it is not subject to replevin; it is not property in a sense that will support 
discovery proceedings; it may not be held as security for funeral costs; it 
cannot be withheld by an express company, or returned to the sender, 
where shipped under a contract calling for cash on delivery; it may not be 
the subject of a gift causa mortis; it is not common law larceny to steal a 
corpse.118   
Taking Venner and Hecht along with this statement in Dougherty further illustrates 
the tension even among state courts as to whether human beings have any legal 
property rights in their bodies.  Thus, on account of its mercurial legal status, the 
human body presents unique issues for lower courts that have attempted to answer 
whether it is property. 
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has not had the opportunity to 
directly address the issue of whether people have any property rights, traditional or 
sui generis, in their organs or tissue or in those of their next of kin upon death.119  
Heeding Justice Arabian’s concerns in Moore, perhaps that is a comforting fact.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has decreed several times that the claim that “one 
has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases” is purely mistaken.120   
For instance, Justice Harlan in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,121 in rejecting a due 
process challenge to a state vaccination statute, iterated that the concept of liberty 
“secured by the Constitution . . . to every person . . . does not import an absolute 
right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint.122  More importantly, Harlan added the following limitation on the rights of 
property: “[r]eal liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle 
which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own . . . regardless of 
the injury that may be done to others.”123   
In addition, Justice Blackmun of the majority in Roe v. Wade124 stated that, 
although the privacy right fashioned in that case may encompass a woman’s abortion 
decision, “this right is not unqualified” and must yield to important interests of the 
sovereign.125   Regardless, the Supreme Court has laid down no uniform judicial rule 
of whether or not the human body and its parts are property.  At best, lower 
American courts have acknowledged an evasive “quasi-property” status.126 
                                                                
118Dougherty, 387 A.2d at 246 (quoting P.E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF 
BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES (2d ed. 1950)). 
119PRICE, supra note 66, at 162. 
120Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
121Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905). 
122Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
123Id.  
124Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
125Id. 
126PRICE, supra note 66, at 159. 
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III.  CONTEMPORARY LAWS AND POLICIES  
REGARDING SALES OF HUMAN ORGANS 
The judicially-constructed quasi-property status of the human body may have 
influenced the legislative enactment of the current prohibition on organ sales.  Both 
federal and state statutes forbid monetary compensation to the donor of any human 
organ.127  On the federal level, the National Organ Transplant Act (hereinafter 
“NOTA”), enacted in 1984, expressly prohibits any direct payment to donors of 
human organs.128  Some sections of NOTA set up administrative guidelines for a 
network of non-profit agencies to facilitate organ procurement and transplantation 
procedures nationally; others arrange criteria for the national and local lists of 
individuals in need of healthy organs, along with a coordinated system which 
matches them with possible donors.129  NOTA narrowly defines “human organ” as 
“the human . . . kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, 
and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ. . . .”130  State regulations 
have similar definitions, with minimal nuances in wording.131  Furthermore, NOTA 
renders illegal any payment to family members of deceased organ donors.132  
Accordingly, NOTA and state statutes provide hefty penalties, including fines or 
imprisonment, for violating their prohibitions on organ sales.133   
In enacting NOTA, Congress intended to prevent for-profit marketing of human 
organs.134  Interestingly, this legislation was rushed through Capitol Hill due to the 
plans of a Virginia physician to arrange a commercial market in human kidneys.135  
In 1983, Dr. H. Barry Jacobs proposed a federally subsidized network that would pay 
for removal and transplant operations of organs to Medicare patients.136  The 
proposition shocked many and was met with immediate congressional dissent, 
                                                                
127National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (2003); see also OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2108.12 (Anderson 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(f) (West 1999). 
12842 U.S.C. § 274e. 
12942 U.S.C. § 273. 
13042 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1). 
131See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(f) (defining “human organ” as “any other human 
organ or nonrenewable or nonregenerative tissue except plasma and sperm”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2108.01 (defining “tissue” negatively as “any body part other than an organ or eye”) 
(emphasis added). 
13242 U.S.C. § 274e; see also Melissa Healy, The Changing Rules of Organ Donation; 
Billboards, Websites and Financial Incentives Are Pushing the Ethical Boundaries, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at F1.   
133See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (imposing a maximum fine of $50,000 and/or a minimum 
imprisonment term of five years for sale of any human organ “if it affects interstate 
commerce”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.99 (proscribing violation of organ sale 
prohibition to be a felony of the fifth degree). 
134S. Rep. No. 98-382, at 4 (1984). 
135Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. 
POST, Sep. 19, 1983, at A9.   
136Id. 
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including then-Tennessee Senator Albert Gore, Jr., vehemently contended that 
“[p]utting organs on a market basis is abhorrent to our system of values.”137  In its 
report, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (hereinafter “the 
Committee”) succinctly advanced the government’s position: “[t]he Committee 
believes that human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.”138  The 
Committee envisioned these dangers to be on the horizon with medical 
advancements of the early 1980s, and it saw the immediate need for federal 
legislation barring the commercial sale of human organs. 
Despite this prohibition on organ sale and purchase, a statute related to NOTA 
actively encourages voluntary, uncompensated donation of human organs: the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (hereinafter “UAGA”).139  Since its two promulgations 
in 1968 and 1987, the UAGA has disseminated statutory guidelines for the 
enactment of state regulations to govern the procurement and transplantation of 
human organs.140  In the vast majority of its text, the UAGA encourages the donation 
of bodily organs for transplantation, so long as such donations are uncompensated.141  
It expressly allows the donation of the human body or a part thereof either by the 
decedent’s wishes or, in some instances, by those of next of kin of the deceased, 
provided that no relative of the donor or any other third party receives monetary 
profit.142  All fifty states have adopted versions of this Uniform Act into their state 
legislative codes.143 
Unlike NOTA, which attends to “live” donations,144 the UAGA focuses entirely 
on donations of anatomical gifts at one’s death.145  It provides that an individual of at 
least eighteen years of age may make an anatomical gift or may refuse to do so.146  
The prefatory note to the UAGA, states the recognition of the quandary of property 
law journeyed in Part II above:   
                                                                
137Id. 
138S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (emphasis added). 
139Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983 & Supp. 2004).   
140Id. 
141Id. 
142Id. at § 10.     
143CAPRON & BIRNBAUM, supra note 53, at 2.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. §§ 7150 to 7156.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1501 to 2-1511 
(2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.910 to 732.922 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
17:2351 to 17:2359 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-501 to 
4-512 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, §§ 7 to 14 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
333.10101 to 333.10109 (West 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300 to 4308 (McKinney 
2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01 to 2108.10 (Anderson 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
157.06 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004). 
144See generally 42 U.S.C. § 274. 
145Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1(1) (defining “anatomical gift” as “a donation of all or 
part of a human body to take effect upon or after death”). 
146Id. at § 2(a). 
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if utilization of bodies and parts of bodies is to be effectuated, a 
number of competing interests in a dead body must be harmonized, and 
several troublesome legal questions must be answered . . . Both the 
common law and the present statutory picture is one of confusion, 
diversity, and inadequacy . . . .The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act . . . 
carefully weighs the numerous conflicting interests and legal problems.  
Wherever adopted it will encourage the making of anatomical gifts, thus 
facilitating therapy involving such procedures . . . .147  
In perhaps its only aspect similar to NOTA, the UAGA also makes illegal the sale or 
purchase of organs from deceased human bodies for valuable consideration.148  Thus, 
while NOTA bars inter vivos transfers of human organs by commercial sale, the 
UAGA likewise prohibits their posthumous transfer by testamentary gift or intestate 
succession if monetary compensation has been bargained for in exchange. 
Supporters of the prohibition on organ sales offer many public policy rationales 
that reflect the need to uphold the dignity and traditionally sacrosanct nature of the 
human body.  Before examining these policies, contemplate first a poignant 
comment of Justice Flaherty of a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court: “[f]orcible 
extraction of living body tissues causes revulsion to the judicial mind.  Such would 
raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this 
portends.”149  Commentators and legal ethicists similarly maintain that any eventual 
financial market compensating donors for their body parts will harm the donors 
themselves, the recipients, and ultimately society itself.150 
In general, an ominous fear of commodification151 of the human body pervades 
nearly all support for the prohibition on organ sales.  Once again, commodification 
describes both the actual sale of a thing as an article of commerce and the subliminal 
envisioning of that thing in “market rhetoric” by the public.152  As Professor Radin’s 
analysis reveals, compensation to organ donors has been widely attacked as 
espousing the notion that people may become viewed as market commodities.153  
The fear is that, should human body parts be granted full property rights, then, as one 
expert put it, “we would become slaves, not in a market for our bodies, but in a 
market for body parts.”154  
                                                                
147Id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
148Id. § 10(a). 
149McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Common Pleas Ct. 1978) (denying a 
preliminary injunction that sought to compel a matching donor to undergo a bone marrow 
transplant). 
150Andrews, supra note 50, at 31. 
151Cf. Radin, supra note 24, at 1855. 
152Id. 
153Andrews, supra note 50, at 35. 
154Id. at 29. 
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Second, many view the present system of organ procurement, embodied in the 
United Network for Organ Sharing,155 as the only ethically permissible method in 
striking the delicate balance between maximizing organ procurement (and in turn 
saving as many lives as possible) and respecting the dignity of the human body.156  
Under Professor Radin’s analysis of commodification, this argument would entail 
that the free donation system for human organs would dissolve should commercial 
sales be permitted.157  In hearings in the House of Representatives before NOTA was 
passed, then-Senator Albert Gore affirmed that “[i]t is against our system of values 
to buy and sell parts of human beings.”158  The core tenet of this argument holds that 
it is simply unethical and inhumane to "put a price on a human life.”159   
Third, supporters of the prohibition assert that lifting the ban would make the 
poor “second-class citizens,” as they would be economically coerced into selling 
their organs to the rich.160  One transplant surgeon positioned the argument like this: 
“[a]ny payment to living donors . . . would ‘create a second-class citizenry’ of people 
whose organs would be commodities and who would risk organ donation under the 
coercion of need.”161  As this argument operates, no matter how honestly an organ 
solicitor may profess that no undue influence occurred, and no matter how 
“voluntarily” a destitute donor attests to have participated in the transaction, the 
element of economic coercion will inevitably have pervaded the donor’s decision.162  
By virtue of lacking money or assets, the poor will not be able to resist the 
temptation to achieve some “quick money” for one of their organs.163  As a result, 
not only would social stratification further polarize, but the general health of the 
lower class would sharply decline, creating a “sub-class” of human beings.164  
Should human body parts be alienable, as this argument dictates, an inescapable aura 
of “economic coercion” would dictate the choices of the lower-class.165 
                                                                
155Healy, supra note 132.  The United Network for Organ Sharing, an administrative 
organization set up by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, polices organ procurement and 
distribution to those in priority of need.  Id. 
156See S. Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
417, 461 (2003); see also Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation 
of a Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1994). 
157Radin, supra note 24, at 1859. 
158National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on 
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 125, 128 (1983) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). 
159CAPRON & BIRNBAUM, supra note 53, at 15. 
160Healy, supra note 132.   
161Id. (quoting Dr. Francis Delmonico, a kidney transplant surgeon in New England). 
162See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 9, at 97. 
163Cf. Alberty da Silva’s experience, as depicted in Rohter, supra note 1. 
164See, e.g., CAPRON & BIRNBAUM, supra note 53, at 16. 
165Bray, supra note 13, at 242. 
2003-04] NO VALUE FOR A POUND OF FLESH 217 
This particular fear has factual support from horrific events involving innocent 
people being murdered for their organs.166  After a large number of killings in 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, some authorities believed that those murders may have been 
linked to an illegal organ trafficking ring between Mexico and the United States.167  
Since 1993, nearly one hundred women had been killed in Ciudad Juarez, the city 
directly across the border from El Paso, Texas.168  With several organs having been 
removed from many of the victims’ bodies, authorities premised that an organ 
trafficking ring may be either the impetus or the culprit itself behind the killings and 
that the slayers then sold the organs in international black markets.169   
Also, return to the plight of the poor Brazilian man in the Introduction of this 
note.170  His story sad but true, Alberty Jose da Silva was solicited one day by an 
Israeli “middleman” from an international “organ syndicate” to undergo a kidney 
removal procedure in a hospital located in Durban, South Africa.171  The recipient of 
da Silva’s kidney was an American woman from Brooklyn, New York, who was 
dying of kidney failure.172  Both recipient and donor were flown to a hospital in 
Durban, South Africa where they underwent the clandestine procedure, illegal under 
the laws of the United States, Brazil, and South Africa.173  After the transplant 
operation, da Silva contracted health problems from the haphazard operation and 
from the loss of one of his kidneys.174  Other poor Brazilians who had sold a kidney 
or liver through the same organ trafficking ring also faced criminal charges by 
Brazilian authorities for their participation.  One particularly unfortunate man was 
robbed of the money that was paid in exchange for his kidney, thus left with so much 
less than he had before his transplant operation.175   
Although this particular “organ trafficking ring” was dissolved by international 
authorities, the organization had facilitated over three hundred illegal organ 
transplants in a Durban hospital since 2001.176  Supporters of the prohibition on 
organ sales readily point to such appalling events internationally where some people 
“sell their flesh to survive”177 and others are killed for their organs, and they posit 
that lifting the ban would invite similar activity here in the United States. 
                                                                
166See Mark Stevenson, Organ Theft Legend Resurfaces in Mexico Border Slayings, 
SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, July 1, 2003, Vol. 27 at 7.   
167Id. 
168Id. 
169Id.  A black market is defined as an “illegal market for goods that are controlled or 
prohibited by the government . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (8th ed. 2004). 
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Conversely, others attack the current legislation prohibiting organ sales as 
paternalistic.  Basically, advocates for donor compensation argue that any price for a 
life-saving organ is preferable to death and that the current law wrongly takes away 
that option.178  Proponents of changing the law to allow for commercial sales of 
human organs cite the shortage of organs in contrast to their vast demand and argue 
that the current system for organ procurement fails year after year to meet the 
need.179  According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for every 
70 people who receive an organ transplant daily in the United States, another 16 die 
due to the growing shortage of organs.180  Other statistics are just as startling.  In 
2004, more than 87,000 people in the United States were on waiting lists for 
organs.181  Since 1993, that number has risen dramatically by 65,000, while the 
number of donations has remained stagnant at approximately 18,000 organs per 
year.182  Indeed, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which 
provides the only national organ patient waiting list, has reported that the list will 
continue to grow.183 
Furthermore, transplant surgeons have pleaded that mere education about organ 
donation has no effect on the problem of supply shortage.184  As one transplant 
surgeon put it, “[w]e’ve done all the education [about organ donation procedures] we 
can do . . . [w]e’re not getting anywhere.185  Additionally, advocates of change argue, 
correctly, that every other “link in the donative chain” of organs does receive 
monetary compensation for its services and that this inequity vindicates a system of 
payment to donors as well.186  Indeed, the UAGA and NOTA both allow “reasonable 
payments” to organ procurement agencies, intermediaries who contact and obtain 
donors, and other participants in the process of organ procurement for “removal, 
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of 
a human organ.”187  Organ donors, however, can receive no outright recompense for 
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their organ under the current law.188  In sum, those in favor of compensation point 
out the inequitable result that the only participants obtaining zero financial gain are 
the sources of the organs themselves.189 
Nevertheless, NOTA does exempt from prohibited “valuable consideration” 
certain reimbursement expenses to the donor, including lost wages and travel and 
housing costs incurred by the donation process.190  The Senate Committee that 
produced the final version of NOTA assured donors that these expenses, though 
limited in dollar amount by organ procurement agencies, would not go 
uncompensated.191  Cognizant of the voiced concern that the prohibition against 
organ sales “may inadvertently make it illegal to reimburse individuals for 
reasonable costs incurred in the process of organ donation”, the Committee assured 
that “[i]t is not [its] intent that any such reasonable costs be considered part of 
valuable consideration.”192  NOTA even provides for federal grants to state 
governments and organ procurement organizations in order to assure donors the 
reimbursement of these “qualifying expenses.”193  Furthermore, in April 2004, 
President George W. Bush signed into law a federal bill that allows reimbursement 
costs to come directly from the organ recipient rather than simply from the federally-
funded organ procurement organizations.194   
In addition, states have enacted legislation assuring reimbursement expenses to 
organ donors.195  Just as within the federal scheme, such statutes compensate organ 
donors for lost wages, any transportation costs, and lodging expenses incurred as 
incident to the transplant procedure.196  However, states are additionally exploring 
the benefit of special tax breaks to organ donors.197  For instance, Wisconsin recently 
decided to allow statutory tax breaks in order to reimburse the “non-consideration” 
expenses incident to organ donation procedures.198  The Wisconsin law, spurring into 
motion similar bills in other states across the nation,199 allows a one-time tax 
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deduction of up to $10,000 for organ donors.200  Still, the donors may only claim this 
deduction for travel and lodging expenses and lost wages incurred as a result of an 
organ donation procedure.201  Thus, the state statutes allowing tax breaks to organ 
donors echo the federal assurance that the donors will receive reimbursement of 
costs incident to the transplantation. 
Thus, while it may be correct to say that organ donors receive no financial profit 
for their organs, one must also acknowledge the fact that the prohibition on sale does 
not leave donors “out in the cold” without any reimbursement for expenses sustained 
through the transplant procedures.  Assuring to organ donors equitable 
reimbursement of expenses incidental to transplant procedures hopefully will 
encourage more people to donate their organs without lifting the prohibition against 
commercial sale of human organs. 
IV.  CONTEMPORARY LAWS AND MARKET PRACTICES  
REGARDING SALES OF GAMETES 
The permission of monetary compensation to “donors”202 of gametes primarily 
originates from statutory definitions of what does and does not constitute a human 
organ for purposes of prohibiting sales.  Several state statutes express that 
regenerative cells are not organs and that the prohibition on purchase and sale does 
not extend to these cells.203  NOTA, however, has no such explicit statement, 
although its consistent interpretation has been to exempt sperm and eggs as not 
within its definition of “human organ.”204  Note, however, the following open-ended 
phrase in that section: “and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including 
that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
by regulation.”205  This ostensibly could include reproductive cells, should the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services pass a regulation so specifying.  In any 
case, human gametes are currently outside the scope of legal status as “organs” for 
purposes of the prohibition on outright sale.206  
                                                                
200WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i)(1) (West 2004).  “[A]n individual may subtract up to 
[$]10,000 from federal adjusted gross income if he or she . . . while living, donates one or 
more of his or her human organs to another human being for human organ  
transplantation . . . .” 
201WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i)(2) (West 2004).  “An individual may claim the subtract 
modification . . . only once, and [it] may be claimed for only the following unreimbursed 
expenses that are incurred by the claimant and related to the claimant’s organ donation: (a) 
Travel expenses, (b) Lodging expenses, (c) Lost wages.” 
202I set off the term “donors” in this way because I consider it a suspect misnomer when 
used in the context of sperm and eggs, as the term traditionally has the legal connotation of 
free giving without compensation.   
203See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(c)(1) (stating that “[h]uman organ includes, but is 
not limited to, a human kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, or any other human organ or non-
renewable or non-regenerative tissue except plasma and sperm”) (emphasis added). 
20442 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1).   
205Id. 
206The state of Louisiana appears to be the lone exception, as it includes all bodily fluids 
and cells in its statutory definition of body “parts.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2351(4) (West 
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Consequently, as distinguishably regenerative parts of the human body, gametes 
can be sold and purchased on the market as transferable and disposable personal 
property.  Indeed, sperm and ova have become market commodities, reaching bids 
from prospective purchasers as high as $15,000 and $50,000, respectively.207  The 
Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago has published that its current charge for a 
complete egg donation cycle is $18,200, which includes “the donor’s fee of 
$5,000.”208  Also, cryobanks such as the N.W. Andrology and Cryobank provide a 
pricing list for semen specimens, ranging from $180 per vial for one vial received to 
$165 per vial for 12 to 24 vials “purchased at the same time.”209  Thus, both 
individual solicitors and the fertility clinics performing the extraction and 
implantation procedures provide monetary compensation to donors for their gametes. 
Just like any other fully market-alienable good, the demand is highest for 
gametes with the greatest quality.210  In this context of sperm and ova donations, this 
postulate of economics manifests itself in a common formula: wealthy individuals or 
couples will pay top dollar to donors with the most “preferred” physical, intellectual, 
and social traits with the hopes of maximizing athleticism, physical attractiveness, 
and intelligence in their offspring.  Within the market for such “high profile” sperm 
and ova,211 the customer is always right, and solicitors have the unbridled discretion 
to reject any potential donor not satisfying their advertised criteria.   
To illustrate this market reality, consider the role that gender plays in the price 
differential between sperm and ova.  Normally, sperm are nearly limitless in supply 
and more easily attainable than ova; and so, they have a lower demand in the 
market.212  Typical prices for sperm donors can range from $45 for a single donation 
“to $200 a week for weekly donations” for a six month duration ($4,800 for six 
months).213  In contrast, ova are normally restricted in supply to only one per month 
for each woman;214 even with today’s technology, the surgical extraction of female 
ova still necessitates time-consuming and possibly painful surgical procedures.215  
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Usually, only with drug-induced hyper-stimulation of the ovaries can more than one 
egg be generated during a given menstrual cycle.216  And so, due to this inherent 
supply-side limitation, ova demand a greater market value than sperm.  
Consequently, private solicitation offers for ova have reached as high as a 
“whopping” $50,000 for a single extraction procedure, while sperm prices have 
reached nowhere near that amount.217  Acknowledging this price differential, one 
cannot deny the consequently economic nature of human gametes as commodified 
property that is fully salable in the market. 
Other contemporary protocols provide further evidence of the market atmosphere 
of human gametes.  For example, the Internal Revenue Service requires donors of 
ova to pay taxes on any money received from the donation process.218  It is also 
common for paying recipients of gametes to account for the donor’s medical bills 
from the procedure.219  These practices supplement the veracity of the averment that 
a market in human gametes exists in the United States. 
Advocates of reimbursement to donors of reproductive cells defend that such 
compensation is merely for the donor’s time, trouble, and, in the case of ova, the 
painful surgical procedure.220  The American Fertility Society has stated its official 
position to view any commercial sale of human ova as wrong but to acknowledge 
reimbursement for donors’ time and inconvenience as readily permissible.221  
Likewise, sperm banks and egg procurement offices typically assert that donors are 
merely being reimbursed for their time and trouble.222  However, attempting to 
“disguise the economic reality of the sale,”223 assertions like these set up a 
comforting but false palliative for gamete donors.   
At any rate, only when a fertility clinic or egg procurement program makes the 
payment to the donor could such assertions have any legitimacy.224  But where 
private individuals have contacted donors through direct or indirect solicitation and 
advertisement, the situation is vastly different.  In these instances, any payment is 
plausibly for the gametes themselves, with procedural costs merely a pretense.225  
Regardless of the professed basis for the payment, remuneration to donors of sperm 
and ova by their solicitors remains legal.226   
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On the other hand, a comparative few have laid arguments against the sale of 
human gametes.  And those contentions that have been advanced mainly concern the 
health implications for women involving the extraction procedures as well as the 
moral and social issues possibly implicated with future offspring.  As to the first 
concern, very little data exists as to the hyper-ovulating drugs needed for the egg 
extraction procedures.227  Understandably, therefore, some women fear for their 
health due to the virtually unknown risks with the drugs they must take in order to 
induce hyper-ovulation.  As to the latter concern, only a few have argued that the 
commodification of human gametes has the potential to threaten the sanctity of 
human dignity.228  However, although neither of these arguments directly addresses 
the problem of commercial sale, each requires same exploration. 
V.  ANALYSIS OF DISPARATE LEGAL TREATMENT  
OF HUMAN “PARTS” AND “PRODUCTS” 
Legal scholars and property theorists, as well as judges, have found it very 
difficult to speak of human body parts without resorting to masking them in property 
terminology.  This is so on account of the dual problem of the human body not fitting 
within the traditional doctrines of property law and judicial hesitance in stating that 
the human body is property.  Given that modern property law has come so far as to 
recognize only limited autonomy over human body parts, the prohibition on 
compensation to donors of organs should not be reconcilable with the contradictory 
retailing of gametes.  Otherwise, some portions of the human body are fully alienable 
personal property, transferable and disposable at the will of their owners, while 
others are inconsistently not alienable property. 
Organs have been effectively deemed market-inalienable; while statutes not only 
allow but encourage their removal from one body and transplant to another, organs 
can receive no market value as tangible personal property.  Without this market-
inalienable status, the result would be that organs could never be transplanted for 
those in need, frustrating the strong societal interest in preserving human life.  On the 
other hand, sperm and ova, have been granted market-alienable status and can 
receive substantial market value, just like any parcel of tangible personal property.  
Supporters of this distinguished treatment of gametes offer a simple argument: it is 
not dangerous to the donor or to society in general to alienate regenerative tissue and 
cells like sperm and ova, while it is extremely hazardous to one’s health and life to 
do so with any non-regenerative body part, for example, a kidney or a liver.229  
Additionally, there may be an intuitive difference between body “parts” (organs) and 
body “products” (gametes and blood).  However, these arguments fail for several 
reasons. 
First, the “blurry line drawn in the sand” between regenerative and non-
regenerative body parts has arguably begun to disappear with unprecedented 
advances in medical technology.230  Recently, surgeons have successfully completed 
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procedures of “splitting” livers, which involves cutting a donated organ into two 
halves.231  The doctors then place each half into two different donees, with the result 
that the half-livers will regenerate into complete, fully functioning livers.232  
Physicians have developed other novel methods for “stretching” the use of donated 
organs.233  For instance, the procedure of “bridging,” endeavoring to “keep a patient 
alive long enough to get a real [organ],” connects failing organs to functional ones.234  
In addition, surgeons have also attempted “xenotransplantation,” entailing 
implantation of organs from nonhuman species into humans.235  Although these 
methods have often been assailed as risky,236 they arguably evidence a current 
medical trend towards accepting the prohibition on organ sales and attempting novel 
ways to address the organ shortage.  Furthermore, obvious ethical issues aside, the 
advent of stem cell research may allow physicians to literally grow new organs from 
stem cells.237  Thus, gametes should no longer be distinguishable from statutorily 
defined “organs” on the sole basis of status as regenerative or non-regenerative.238 
Second, unlike the relative simplicity of sperm donation, the egg harvesting 
procedure is extremely lengthy, invasive, and risky for a woman’s health.239  The 
process of egg extraction involves hyper-stimulation of the ovaries in order to 
produce a large amount of eggs per cycle, rather than just one.240  Ovarian hyper-
stimulation can produce serious health risks for women, including ovarian hyper-
stimulation syndrome.241  Although less common than simple aches and pains as side 
effects of hyper-stimulation and surgical removal of ova, this retention of fluid by 
the ovaries could present a possibly life-threatening condition for a woman.242  Far 
more serious, albeit less frequent, side-effects risked by egg donation procedures 
include infertility and ovarian cancer.243  Therefore, health risks permeate both ends 
of the spectrum of human body parts, and any argument that organ donation 
definitively presents more serious health risks can be misleading. 
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Third, compensation to donors of sperm and ova exploits the participants for their 
gametes while presenting dangers to society.  College newspaper advertisements and 
egg brokerage firms “capitaliz[e] on the human desire for a child while 
simultaneously exploiting young women and undervaluing their social worth as 
individuals.”244  As the Senate Committee for NOTA stated, “individual pleas 
through television and newspaper articles . . . may be counterproductive to the needs 
of many others requiring organ transplantation.”245  Moreover, private solicitors of 
“high profile” gametes sometimes promise vast sums of money merely to attract as 
many applicants as possible to the pool.246  Quite often, according to the New York 
Advisory Group on Assisted Reproductive Technologies, the advertiser does not 
intend to pay much at all.247  And so, open solicitation for any human body part, 
gamete and organ alike, may unfairly deprive others just as deserving or needy from 
equal access to organs and gametes.   
Just as importantly, donors of ova and sperm may be left legally unprotected by 
law should they seek to assert any rights over their gametes.248  Egg procurement 
agencies routinely inform donors that they “have no control over what happens” to 
their gametes once they donate their cells.249  This fact spawns a myriad of other 
issues, such as whether a biological mother – the donor of the egg – could 
conceivably condition her donation on visitation rights with her biological child 
throughout its life.  While the conviction of some donors may hold that visitation or 
even custody rights over the offspring conceived from their gametes cannot be 
denied them should they legally pursue vindication of such rights,250 in general, 
courts have met the enforceability of agreements or contracts like these with little 
welcome.   
In the analogous situation of surrogacy contracts, several courts have held such 
contracts void as contrary to the strong public policy that a mother should have time 
after her child’s birth to reflect on her wishes concerning the child.251  In one case in 
particular, the court held that a surrogacy contract should be given no legal effect 
where the mother’s agreement was obtained prior to a reasonable time after the 
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child’s birth or where “the agreement was induced by the payment of money.”252  
Thus, for similar reasons, payment to egg donors for their ova may void any contract 
for visitation rights or custody that the donor seeks to enter into with the donee prior 
to the surgical extraction.  The same will likely hold true for donors of sperm who 
wish to assert paternal rights over the offspring from their sperm.  Permitting full 
property status to sperm and ova by allowing outright sale on the market has opened 
the door for these risks.  
Returning to Professor Radin’s personhood model for justifying property rights, I 
propose a system of full and equal market-inalienability for all human body parts – 
organs and gametes.  A “gifts only” regime will best protect the interests of donors 
involved and at the same time preserve altruistic donation.253  As Radin suggests, 
once an object receives market value, altruism is forever undermined, and every 
subsequent transfer of that object faces risk of being drowned in market 
terminology.254 
Radin’s slippery slope argument of market commodities has a further implication 
for gamete donation.  She posits that,  
[i]f we permit babies to be sold, we commodify not only the mother’s 
(and father’s) baby-making capacities – which might be analogous to 
commodifying sexuality – but we also conceive of the baby in market 
rhetoric.  When a baby becomes a commodity, all of its personal attributes 
– sex, eye color, predicted I.Q., predicted height, and the like – become 
commodified as well.”255 
Not only could babies as human persons face the danger of becoming market 
commodities, but potentially all human, personal traits will also suffer the 
classification of market goods.256  This is the very reason why, in this context, there 
lies no difference – logical or semantic – between body “parts” and body “products. 
Thus, websites and college newspaper ads that solicit donors with “preferred” 
traits arguably foster an ominous 21st century culture of eugenics, in which people 
not only “shop” for their babies but also for the perfect characteristics and attributes 
of their offspring.  Flatly, the permitted compensation for human gametes, to borrow 
again from Mill, “has made property of things which never ought to be property, and 
absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist.”257  The market 
reality of sales in human gametes must end, as the monetization of human 
reproductive capacity in this way promotes a looming attitude that all human 
attributes are equally commodifiable. 
As possible solutions for achieving market-inalienability of gametes, consider the 
following situation where both organs and reproductive cells have been equally 
denied monetary compensation.  EBay, Inc. is an Internet company operating under 
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the website eBay.com by which users may purchase and sell items of virtually 
limitless variety in a unique auction format.258  In general, the online auction site 
states in its guidelines that “the human body or any human body parts may not be 
listed on eBay.”259  Specifically, eBay prohibits auctions featuring sperm and ova for 
sale in addition to those featuring organs for sale.260  This provides an example of a 
private industry pronouncing that both organs and gametes are not suitable for sale in 
its market. 
However, private declarations like eBay’s prohibition still do not have the full 
force of law.  A possible legal solution would be to utilize an avenue available and 
present in the National Organ Transplant Act since its inception.  In defining “human 
organ,” NOTA includes the phrase “and any other human organ (or any subpart 
thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services by regulation.”261  The Secretary could simply regulate that human 
gametes be included in the ban against monetary purchase as subparts of human 
organs.  Gametes would no longer be market commodities, but the system would still 
allow donors to be reimbursed for incidental expenses and costs, just as it permits 
with organ donations.   
In addition, the United States could follow the lead of other countries that have 
prohibited the sale of gametes.  In early 2004, the Italian Parliament passed a bill 
banning, among other forms of assisted reproduction, egg donation and artificial 
insemination using donated sperm.262  This bill, passed into law by Italy’s President 
on February 19, 2004, reportedly grew out of loud dissent from the vicinage of the 
Roman Catholic Church against “monstrous and sacrilegious” experiments with 
frozen embryos that were conceived from donated gametes.263  Canada has also 
banned monetary compensation to donors of reproductive cells, “due to the 
arguments concerning exploiting women for their reproductive capabilities and . . . 
doctors playing God.”264  The United States should take this lead from other 
industrialized countries and ban the outright sale of human gametes. 
Pursuing the other route that some have suggested, to “start acknowledging that 
people’s body parts are their personal property,” would set dangerous precedent.265  
This attitude often manifests itself in the phrase, disturbingly ubiquitous in 21st 
century culture, “it’s my body; I can do with it what I want.”  While some may cite 
to ambiguous and, quite frankly, tenuous notions of fundamental liberty in 
supporting such an assertion, the ultimate question remains as to whether property 
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law has ever recognized or is prepared to recognize a market-alienable right to 
financial compensation for bartering with one’s body.  Moreover, as stated in Part II 
above, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently refused to 
acknowledge the existence of such an unlimited right.266 
One need only look toward the terrible exploitation of poor individuals abroad to 
harness truly the dangerous potential of declaring human body parts property.267  As 
Professor Radin feared, once some aspects of the human body become commodified, 
all human attributes may face the peril of suffering a similar fate.268  Furthermore, 
several states have commenced granting donors of organs more than adequate 
reimbursement for their expenses incurred, including some which have offered 
generous tax breaks in order to encourage more donations.269  Donors of gametes 
already receive similar reimbursement expenses.  In sum, since the law appropriately 
prohibits compensation to donors of organs for strong reasons of public policy, it 
should also deny compensation to donors of gametes. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A fascinating and seemingly endless legal dispute has gone on for centuries 
regarding whether the human body and its components are the personal property of 
each person.  This much is certain: if the human body is not property, then it may not 
be subject to sale.  But even if the human body could be classified as some sui 
generis form of property, the debate subsists upon the issue of whether body parts 
should receive monetary value in the market.  This note has proposed that the human 
body must achieve full and equal market-inalienability throughout for the 
preservation and respect of human personhood.   
Notwithstanding a disputable modern trend towards recognizing property 
interests in human body parts, legislatures and courts have still limited these rights, 
however they may be categorized, by balancing them with strong public policies.  In 
order to align these policies more properly with fundamental tenets of property law, 
the prohibition against sale and purchase of human organs must harmonize with a 
similar prohibition on compensation for human gametes. 
As the current system in the United States prohibits the sale of organs but permits 
commercial sale of human gametes, the latter must adjust in order to achieve 
complete market-inalienability of the human body.  Only then will “put[ting] a price 
on human life” be truly impossible.270   
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